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THE FEDERALLY FUNDED Snowflakes Embryo Adoption Program
("Snowflakes") endeavors to "share God's love" by " [r] ecognizing and
advocating the personhood of pre-born children."' As part of this mis-
sion, Snowflakes facilitates one couple's "adoption"2 of human em-
bryos created for use in another couple's in-vitro fertilization ("IVF"),3
but which remain unused at the end of the process.4 This practice was
regularly called "embryo donation" prior to Snowflakes' formation in
1997,5 and terming it an "adoption" has import beyond the lVF con-
* Class of 2009; Technical Editor, University of San Francisco Law Review, Volume 43;
B.A., New York University, 2004. I am immeasurably grateful to Jack Praetzellis, whose
patience and skill give law review editors everywhere a good name. Thanks also to
Professor Maya Manian, who first suggested I research the Snowflakes Program, and who
gave me invaluable feedback on earlier drafts. Finally, I am forever indebted to my
amazing mother for her unwavering love and support.
1. Nightlight Christian Adoptions, About Us, http://www.nightlight.org/About-
Nightlight.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Nightlight, About Us].
2. In this Comment, I refer to "adoption," set off by quotation marks, to emphasize
my complete and total skepticism regarding the use of the word in the embryo context.
3. IYE allows for human conception completely outside of the uterus. Marcia Joy
Wurmbrand, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079,
1082 (1986) (describing lVF as "the method of uniting egg and sperm outside the body
and transferring the resulting embryo to a woman's uterus to achieve pregnancy"). The
process enables the 6.5 to 10 million estimated couples in the United States who suffer
from infertility to conceive a child. Olga Batsedis, Note, Embryo Adoption: A Science Fiction or
an Alternative to Traditional Adoption , 41 FAm. CT. REv. 565, 566 (2003).
4. See generally Nightlight Christian Adoptions Home Page, http://www.nightlight.
org (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
5. See Phillip Ball, Embryos upfor Adoption, NATuRE, June 10, 2005, available at http://
wwv.nature.com/news/2005/050610/full/news5O6O6-16.html; see also Liza Mundy, Souls
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text. Indeed, because of the inherent ideological links between em-
bryo "adoption" and the thorny debate over legal abortion, advances
in the former are inextricably tied to limitations on the latter.
This Comment argues that the recent use of the term "adoption"
to define the decision of one couple to donate an unused embryo to a
different couple for implantation is simply an attempt by those op-
posed to abortion to chip away at reproductive rights. The belief that
an embryo is entitled to the same legal protection as a living child
placed for adoption is impossible to reconcile with the treatment of
the fetus in current abortion law;6 and if we accept that embryos are
"pre-born children waiting for a chance at life," as Snowflakes suggests
in its literature,7 this characterization will have far-reaching and dam-
aging consequences in the context of abortion rights.
Part I of this Comment tracks the evolution of abortion jurispru-
dence over the last thirty-five years, from Roe v. Wade,8 to Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,9 to Stenberg v. Carhart ("Carhart I") ,10 and finally, to
Gonzales v. Carhart ("Carhart II")."1 Casey and Carhart II offer the
starkest rhetorical contrasts and demonstrate the Roberts Court's
likely trajectory on the abortion issue in the coming years. Part II in-
troduces the reader to Snowflakes and discusses other institutional-
ized uses of pro-life rhetoric to regulate IVF. Part III analyzes the
effect of such rhetoric, and argues that the obvious interchangeability
of "adoption" and "donation" in the IVF context demonstrates that
Snowflakes is merely an extension of the war on abortion that was first
on Ice: America's Embryo Glut and the Wasted Promise of Stem Cell Research, MOTHERJONES, July/
Aug. 2006, available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/07/souls-ice-americas-
embryo-glut-and-wasted-promise-stem-cell-research ("In the course of this debate, embryos
have emerged as another tool for truly hardline conservatives looking for new ways to beat
back abortion rights. Like 'fetal rights' laws that seemingly protect unborn children from
acts of homicide, 'embryo rights' are being waved about as a weapon in the assault on
abortion rights, as anti-abortion lawmakers talk about seizing control over frozen embryo
stores; limiting the creation of new embryos; or both.").
6. Katheryn D. Katz, The Legal Status of the Ex Utero Embryo: Implications for Adoption
Law, 35 CAP. U. L. REv. 303, 339 (2006). This is because embryos are only entitled to legal
protection once viable. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992); see
also discussion infra Part I.B.
7. NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, SNowFLAKES EMBRYO ADOPTIONS FAcT SHEET 1
(2004), available at http://www.nightlight.org/media/pdf/Snowflakesfacts.pdf (hereinaf-
ter NIGHTLIGHT, SNOWFLAKES FACr SHEET].
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. 505 U.S. 833.
10. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
11. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
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waged in the courtroom and that is now carried out in the far more
hospitable realm of assisted reproductive technology.
I. The Rhetoric of Abortion Jurisprudence
Few political discussions elicit the same intensity or polarity as the
debate over a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Advocates
on both sides speak in absolute terms, often married to their views
with an unshakable conviction. 12 Several United States Supreme
Court decisions have noted this ferocity of opinion, 13 and some of the
more rhetorically charged decisions have even added to the debate.1 4
In these cases, any deliberate deviation from neutral treatment by the
Court to the advantage of one side is vehemently protested by the
other. There is virtually no room for compromise when the conse-
quences that flow from the Court's diction are so important.
Such deeply held beliefs arise in part because the abortion debate
implicates what is often religious-based disagreement over when and
how life actually begins. 15 On the one hand, those who believe that
life begins at conception urge that the affirmative act of terminating a
pregnancy at any stage after conception is akin to the murder of a
12. The reader will undoubtedly observe throughout the course of this Comment (if
not from its title) that I have my own very passionate views on abortion, and what I perceive
as recent attempts to chip away at Roe. Despite this bias, I have endeavored to appropriately
temper my rhetoric where possible. The fact that I found it so difficult, however, is a true
testament to the power that rhetoric wields in framing political viewpoints.
13. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 116 ("We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the
sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views,
even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the sub-
ject inspires."); Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 ("Men and women of good conscience can disagree,
and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual impli-
cations of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.").
14. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Stenberg v. Car-
hart (Carhart I1), 530 U.S. 914 (2000); see also discussion infra Part I.B-D.
15. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116 ("One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to
the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and
family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are
all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion."). The
Catholic Church is unsurprisingly opposed to legal abortion: in February 2006, Pope Bene-
dict XVI declared that the Church's belief in the "sacred... character of every human life
... is valid already at the beginnings of life of an embryo, before it is implanted in the
womb of the mother." Nicole Winfield, In Vitro Embryos Sacred, Pope Says: Pontiff Affirms
Church Teaching on Conception as the Start of Life, COLUMBUS DISPATcH, Feb. 28, 2006, at Al;
see also Katz, supra note 6, at 319. The Pope noted further that "[t]he love of God doesn't
make any difference between the newly conceived, still in the womb of his mother, and the
baby, or young person, or the mature man or the old man." Winfield, supra, at Al.
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living, breathing baby.1 6 On the other hand, those who believe that
life begins only once a fetus is viable and able to survive independent
of the mother, argue that the right to seek an abortion derives from a
woman's decisional and bodily autonomy.' 7
The Supreme Court has created a legal framework for regulating
abortion based on the view that the Constitution enables a woman to
make an informed decision about "whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy," free from unduly burdensome government regulation.' 8
In order to understand the threat that "adoption" rhetoric poses to
16. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (discussing the "theory" of the National Right to Life
Committee that "human life is present from the moment of conception"); id. at 131 (not-
ing that the Pythagoreans believed that "the embryo was animate for the moment of con-
ception, and [that] abortion meant destruction of a living being"); see alsoJaime E. Conde,
Embryo Donation: The Government Adopts A Cause, 13 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 273, 284-85
(2006) (describing the "massacre" of "living human embryos" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
17. Still others maintain that life does not begin until actual birth. See Roe, 410 U.S. at
160 ("There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live
birth.").
18. Id. at 117. How the Roe Court framed the fundamental right at issue is particularly
notable. The Supreme Court often uses broad definitions when finding a violation of a
fundamental right, see, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."), and narrow definitions when denying the
application of strict scrutiny, see, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding
that the right to privacy does not protect a right to engage in homosexual sodomy), over-
ruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Justices Scalia and Brennan noted the importance of framing in Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), a decision addressing whether a natural father can control the
upbringing of a child born out of wedlock. The two Justices disagreed on the right at issue
and each pressed for a different result. In a footnote buried within the majority's opinion,
Justice Scalia wrote: "J[ustice] B[rennan] criticizes our methodology in using historical
traditions specifically relating to the rights of an adulterous natural father, rather than
inquiring more generally 'whether parenthood is an interest that historically has received
our attention and protection.'" Id. at 127 n.6. He continued:
We do not understand why, having rejected our focus upon the societal tradition
regarding the natural father's rights vis-A-vis a child whose mother is married to
another man, J[ustice] B[rennan] would choose to focus instead upon
"parenthood." Why should the relevant category not be even more general-per-
haps "family relationships"; or "personal relationships"; or even "emotional at-
tachments in general"?
Id. Indeed, Justice Scalia andJustice Brennan both recognized that even those comfortable
infringing upon the rights of an "adulterous natural father" would undoubtedly find it
more difficult to reject an individual's right to experience "emotional attachments." Id.
Similarly, just as the Court is willing to protect the "abortion decision," see Roe, 410
U.S. at 154, it might be equally unwilling to protect "the killing of an unborn child," if
framed that way. This same rhetoric also informs the popular nomenclature that groups
for and against abortion have adopted to describe their ideology: if you are in favor of
abortion, you are "pro-choice," a label focusing on the right of the woman to make a deci-
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this right, it is important to first understand the Court's trajectory on
this issue over the past thirty-five years.
A. The Supreme Court Articulates a Standard in Roe v. Wade
Roe v. Wade provides the foundation for our current abortion ju-
risprudence. Prior to the 1973 decision, each state drafted its own laws
to regulate abortion, depending on the public policy demands pre-
sent within the jurisdiction.19 In Roe, however, the Supreme Court re-
lied on the penumbral right to privacy and held that the decision to
terminate a pregnancy falls within the constitutionally protected
"zone [ ] of privacy,"20 which can be regulated only when justified by a
"compelling state interest."21 The Court importantly refused to recog-
nize the unborn fetus as a person, and expressly acknowledged that
the fetus bears no constitutional rights. 22
In order to balance the competing interests present in the de-
bate, the Roe Court created a trimester framework, holding that states
concerned with "protecting prenatal life" can limit access to abortion
only in the third trimester (after roughly seven months of preg-
nancy).23 Prior to the third trimester, Roe recognized only quality
sion about her body; in contrast, if you are opposed to abortion, you are "pro-life," a label
placing emphasis on the fetus' so-called "right to life."
19. One such Texas law was subject to constitutional challenge in Roe. 410 U.S. at 117
(discussing the relevant provisions of the Texas Penal Code that make it a crime to "pro-
cure an abortion," except when the mother's health is at risk).
20. Id. at 153.
21. Id. at 155.
22. Id. at 158. As Justice Stevens recognized in his separate opinion in Casey, discussed
infta, "[f]rom this holding, there was no dissent, indeed no Member of the Court has ever
questioned this fundamental proposition." Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted).
The Roe majority noted the inconsistencies inherent in Texas's argument that the fe-
tus is a rights-bearing "person" under the Constitution:
When Texas urges that a fetus is entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection as
a person, it faces a dilemma. Neither in Texas nor in any other State are all abor-
tions prohibited. Despite broad proscription, an exception [for the health and/
or life of the mother] always exists.... But if the fetus is a person who is not to be
deprived of life without due process of the law, and if the mother's condition is
the sole determinant, does not the Texas exception appear to be out of line with
the Amendment's command?
410 U.S. at 157 n.54.
The Court further belied the incongruity of Texas's position that a woman who seeks
an abortion is not chargeable under the statute, and that the penalties for a criminal abor-
tion are less than those for murder. Id. "If the fetus is a person, why is the woman not a
principle or an accomplice? ... If the fetus is a person, may the penalties be different?" Id.
23. Id. at 163-65. The Court observed that at this point in a pregnancy, the "fetus...
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id. at 163.
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medical care and the protection of maternal health as sufficiently im-
portant state interests to justify restrictions on the procedure. 24 Nota-
bly absent from this pre-viability balancing is any claimed interest in
abortion prevention.
In so holding, the Court endeavored to resolve the difficult abor-
tion issue "by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of pre-
dilection."25 Keeping with this goal, the decision places "emphasis
upon[ ] medical and medical-legal history"26 and expressly rejects any
desire "[to] resolve the difficult [moral] question of when life be-
gins."27 The Court therefore refrains from using charged language,
referring instead to the "embryo, '28 the "fetus," 29 and the "unborn,"30
all neutral terms, where appropriate. 31 The decision also discusses the
rights of both the "woman"32 and the "mother,"33 and the "profes-
sional judgment"34 of "respectable physicians. ' '3 5 These uncontrover-
sial rhetorical choices seemed obvious at the time and are only
notable when analyzed alongside the emotionally charged terms used
in later decisions. 36
B. A New Test Emerges in Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey modified Roe to some degree,
but also reaffirmed a woman's constitutional right to seek an abor-
tion. 37 Casey specifically rejected Roe's "rigid" trimester framework 38
and instead adopted a new "undue burden" standard under which to
24. Id. at 164-65.
25. Id. at 117.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 159. The Court continued: "When those trained in the respective disciplines
of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary,
at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to
the answer." Id.
28. See, e.g., id. at 131.
29. See, e.g., id. at 132.
30. See, e.g., id. at 130.
31. Compare Nightlight, About Us, supra note 1 (referring to "the personhood of pre-
born children"), with OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY ONLINE (2007) (Draft Entry) (defining
"preborn" to mean "[o]f or designating a fetus," and noting that the term originated with
"anti-abortion campaigners").
32. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 129 (referring to "the pregnant woman's life").
33. Id. at 130 (referring to "the life of the mother").
34. Id. at 165.
35. See, e.g., id. at 142.
36. See Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart
(Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914 (2000); see also discussion infra Part I.C-D.
37. 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992).
38. Id. at 872.
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analyze state regulation of abortion.39 The plurality observed that
states do have an interest in the potentiality of human life that exists
throughout the entire length of pregnancy, but held that interest be-
comes controlling only post-viability. 40 Thus, states can only restrict
abortion prior to viability if such restrictions do not constitute a "sub-
stantial obstacle" in a woman's choice to seek an abortion. 41 After a
fetus becomes viable (which the Court recognized is around six to
seven months, accounting for advances in medicine), any state regula-
tion of the procedure is permissible-including complete prohibi-
tion-provided that at all times there remains an exception for the
health and life of the woman. 4 2
In so holding, the Court again employed neutral rhetoric. Writ-
ing for the plurality, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter regu-
larly used the term "fetus,"43 and only referred to the fetus as a "child"
once it developed past the point of "viability. '44 Indeed, more broadly,
while the Court conceded that abortion is a procedure "some deem
nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life, '" 4 5 it
also recognized that "the ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives."' 46 Based on this important
effect of Roe, the Court articulated its express unwillingness to aban-
don the precedent that so wholly "defin [ed] the capacity of women to
act in society, and to make reproductive decisions. '47
Other rhetoric in the Casey decision echoes this latter sentiment
and focus on the reproductive rights of the woman. 48 Perhaps most
39. Id. at 887.
40. Id. at 869-71.
41. Id. at 877.
42. See id. at 846.
43. See, e.g., id. at 834.
44. See, e.g., id.
45. Id. at 852. The Court further noted that although "[s]ome of [the Justices] as
individuals find abortion offensive to . .. basic principles of morality, .. . [the Court's]
obligation is to define the liberty for all, [and] not to mandate [the judges'] own moral
code." Id. at 850. In this sense, the Casey Court invoked the spirit of the Roe Court before it
that abortion must be regulated "by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of
predilection." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
46. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
47. Id. at 860.
48. See, e.g., id. at 852 (noting that "the liberty of the woman [faced with a pregnancy]
is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law"); id. ("Her
suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own
vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our
history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her
own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.").
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notably, the first and last word in the Court's opinion is the same:
"liberty."49 With this rhetorical device, the plurality signaled emphati-
cally that any analysis of the constitutional right to reproductive au-
tonomy must start and end with consideration of the woman's
"liberty." Indeed, the plurality makes clear that like other difficult is-
sues that have come before the Court,50 the decision to terminate a
pregnancy "involv[es] the most intimate and personal choices a per-
son may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, [and which] are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."5 1 Thus, concludes the Court, "[a]t the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 52
Despite the apparent victory in reaffirming the right to an abor-
tion, many pro-choice advocates remained skeptical of the Casey deci-
sion, as was Justice Blackmun, who stated in his concurrence: "I
remain steadfast in my belief that the right to reproductive choice is
entitled to the full protection afforded by this Court [in the past].'
Indeed, Justice Blackmun was forthright in his "fear for the dark-
ness"54 that would fall from "but a single [future] vote" against Roe.55
He particularly "fear[ed]" Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opin-
ion, in which Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justice Black-
mun noted the "complete omission of any discussion [in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent] of the effects that compelled childbirth and
motherhood have on women's lives."'56 Justice Blackmun's fear in this
regard appears fully realized in Carhart II, where the woman is but a
mere afterthought in the majority's consideration. 57
49. Id. at 844 ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."); see also id. at
901 ("We invoke [the covenant between past and future generations] to define the free-
dom guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the promise of liberty.").
50. Id. at 851 (including within this category decisions regarding "marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education").
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 943.
56. Id. at 941.
57. See discussion infra Part I.D.
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C. Casey Applied in Carhart I
In Carhart , a Nebraska physician challenged a state law banning
the so-called "partial birth abortion" procedure. 58 The Court analyzed
the statute's constitutionality using Casey's "undue burden" standard
and found that the law failed for two important reasons. First, the
Court held that the language of the statute, aimed at one particular
type of late-term abortion procedure, was overly broad and could too
easily be interpreted to prohibit other, legal abortion procedures. 59
Second, the Court also warned that the statute was unconstitutional
because it lacked a health exception for the woman. 60 Because Casey
requires that post-viability restrictions on abortion have an exception
for both the life and health of the woman, Carhart I reasoned the same
must also be true of pre-viability restrictions. 61
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Breyer discussed the various
methods for performing abortions "in technical detail."62 He con-
ceded at the outset that his discussion might seem "cold or callous to
some, [and] perhaps horrifying to others," but noted that he found
"no alternative way ... to acquaint the reader with the technical dis-
tinctions . . . upon which the outcome of [the] case depends. '63 Jus-
tice Breyer then proceeded to use medical terms where appropriate,
including "fetus, ' 64 "tissue,' 65 and "gestation," among others. 66 Impor-
tantly, he also identified the relevant abortion procedures by their
medical names, including "dilation and evacuation" ("D&E") ,67 "in-
tact D&E, ' '68 and "dilation and extraction" ("D&X") .69
58. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914, 915 (2000). Notable here is the
Nebraska legislature's powerful choice of rhetoric in terming the procedure "partial birth."
See id. at 921-22 ("'No partial birth abortion shall be performed in this state .... '" (quot-
ing NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 1999)). The statute further de-
fined "'partial birth abortion"' as "'an abortion procedure in which the person
performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the
unborn child and completing the delivery.'" Id. at 922 (quoting NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-
326(9)) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 939-40. The majority reasoned that physicians might fear future prosecution
for the performance of legal abortions, which could produce a chilling effect. See id.
60. Id. at 930-31.
61. Id. at 930. The Court recognized that this is especially true because the state's
interest in the "potentiality of human life" is weaker at this stage. See id.
62. Id. at 923.
63. Id. This harkens back to the approach adopted in Roe, which placed "emphasis
upon[ ] medical and medical-legal history ... " Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973).
64. See, e.g., Carhart 1, 530 U.S. at 924.
65. See, e.g., id. at 925-26.
66. See, e.g., id. at 924.
67. See, e.g., id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
68. See, e.g., id. at 927 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The dissenting opinions reject this medical terminology outright,
employing instead the inflamed rhetoric at the very heart of the Ne-
braska statute, 70 rhetoric that so incenses the pro-choice community. 71
Indeed, in the very first paragraph of his dissent, Justice Scalia writes
of "the abortionist" who "kill[s] a human child" through a "live-birth
abortion. ' 72 He describes the D&E procedure at issue as "horrible,"
"visibly brutal," and tending to "evoke [ ] a shudder of revulsion. 73
Justice Kennedy embraces this same rhetorical assault in his sepa-
rately written dissent. He, too, refers to the attending physician as an
"abortionist"74 and condemns the procedure in which, in his view,
"[t] he fetus ... dies just as a human adult or child would: It bleeds to
death as it is torn limb from limb. '75 Evoking this same sentiment,
Justice Thomas writes that the specific late-term abortion procedure is
"a method of abortion that millions find hard to distinguish from in-
fanticide .... "76 He debunks Justice Breyer's description of the proce-
dure as "sanitized"77 and blasts the majority's rejection of "partial
69. See, e.g., id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. See discussion supra note 58.
71. See, e.g., Press Release, National Organization for Women, NOW Blasts Passage of
Abortion Procedures Ban, Denounces Deceptive Use of "Partial Birth" Rhetoric (Mar. 13,
2003), available at http://www.now.org/press/03-03/03-13b.html (reacting to similar rhet-
oric in the federal abortion ban). National Organization for Women President Kim Gandy
states:
You won't find the term "partial birth abortion" in any medical dictionary-in-
stead try looking for it in the ultraconservative rhetoric manual .... Contrary to
what opponents of abortion rights would have you believe, this bill is not about a
specific late-term procedure. This bill, like each of its predecessors, is purposely
worded so vaguely that it could criminalize even some of the safest and most
common abortion procedures after twelve weeks and well before fetal viability.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mother Jones, Partial Birth Abortion Ban's
Both Arbitrary and Dangerous, http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2007/04/partial-birth-
abortion-bans-both-arbitrary-and-dangerous (Apr. 18, 2007, 11:29 PST) (blog post by Eliza-
beth Gettelman) ("[L]et's get one thing clear: there is no such thing as a 'partial birth
abortion.' This term was born of the clever marketing of the anti-choice movement (or
'pro-life' as they like to be called) and has no medical foundation whatsoever.").
72. Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. Justice Scalia further invokes Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), suggesting that the Court's reaffir-
mation of Casey and Roe is akin to these indefensible decisions which have long been over-
turned. Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 953 ("I am optimistic enough to believe that, one day, Stenberg
v. Carhart will be assigned its rightful place in the history of this Court's jurisprudence
... ."). He later bemoans the overturning of the "humane" and "antibarbarian" statute that
bans this procedure, a result he finds "tragic." Id. at 954.
74. Id. at 958.
75. Id. at 958-59.
76. Id. at 982.
77. Id. at 983.
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birth" terminology (in favor of "intact D&E" or "D&X") as ideologi-
cally motivated "to make this procedure appear to be medically
sanctioned." 78
In all of this, the dissenters endeavor to equate the fetus growing
inside the woman's uterus with a living, breathing child who can be
"kill[ed] ."79 Quite aware of this motive, Justice Stevens rejects the dis-
senting opinions as mere "rhetoric."8 0 In his concurrence, he writes:
Justice G[insburg] and Judge Posner have, I believe, correctly diag-
nosed the underlying reason for the enactment of this legislation-
a reason that also explains much of the Court's rhetoric directed at
an objective that extends well beyond the narrow issue that this
case presents. The rhetoric is almost, but not quite, loud enough to
obscure the quiet fact that during the past 27 years, the central
holding of Roe v. Wade has been endorsed by all but 4 of the 17
Justices who have addressed the issue. That holding-that the word
"liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment includes a woman's right
to make this difficult and extremely personal decision-makes it
impossible for me to understand how a State has any legitimate
interest in requiring a doctor to follow any procedure other than
the one that he or she reasonably believes will best protect the wo-
man in her exercise of this constitutional liberty.81
Justice Ginsburg stated this another way in her own concurrence
when she noted the simple fact that the Nebraska statute at issue,
while not reducing the actual number of abortions, simply "prohibits
the [relevant] procedure because the state legislators seek to chip
away at the private choice shielded by [Roe], even as modified by
[Casey]. "82 She concludes that "if a statute burdens constitutional
rights and all that can be said on its behalf is that it is the vehicle that
legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility to those rights,
the burden is undue."83
D. Take Two in Carhart H
Only three years after the Court's decision in Carhart I, a con-
servative United States Congress passed the so-called Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban of 2003,84 a federal prohibition on the same procedure
78. Id. at 987 n.5.
79. Id. at 953. 1 argue that this broad pro-life objective also drives the rhetorical favor-
ing of embryo "adoption" over "donation." See discussion infra Part III.
80. Carhart 1, 530 U.S. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring).
81. Id. (internal citations omitted).
82. Id. at 952 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
83. Id.
84. Once again, the very titie of the Act takes an ideological position. "The term 'par-
tial-birth abortion' is neither recognized in the medical literature nor used by physicians
who perform second-trimester abortions. The medical community refers to the procedure
Winter 2009]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
targeted by the Nebraska statute. 85 Learning from Carhart I and heed-
ing the advice in Justice O'Connor's concurrence, at least to some
degree, 86 Congress used a more specific definition of the practice to
be banned, and included a scienter requirement to ensure that un-
knowing physicians would not be punished under the Act.87 Impor-
tantly, however, the statute still lacked an exception for the health of
the woman, an omission that proved fatal to the Nebraska statute.
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, deferred to
Congress's "findings" that the banned procedure is never required to
protect the health of the mother, and therefore held that no health
exception is required since there will always be an equally safe and
legal alternative procedure. 88
The Court's decision in Carhart II is an "alarming" departure
from past abortion jurisprudence in several respects. 89 First, the Court
successfully continues the rhetorical attack against legal abortion first
waged in the dissenting opinions to Carhart I. Justice Kennedy regards
the fetus as a "child."90 He labels the relevant abortion procedure
"brutal,"91 "gruesome,"' 9 2 "shocking," 93 and "inhumane,' 94 involving as
it does "tear[ing] [the fetus] apart"95 and "ripping [off]" its limbs.96
as either dilation [and] extraction ... or intact dilation and excavation .. " Gonzales v.
Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 n.1 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003). As observed by Justice Ginsburg: "The Act's sponsors left
no doubt that their intention was to nullify [the Court's] ruling in [Carhart 1] .... Carhart
11, 127 S. Ct. at 1643 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also id.
(citing 149 Cong. Rec. 5731 (2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum) ("Why are we here? We
are here because the Supreme Court defended the indefensible .... We have responded
to the Supreme Court."); 148 Cong. Rec. 14,273 (2002) (statement of Rep. Linder) (re-
jecting the proposition that Congress has "no right to legislate a ban on this horrible prac-
tice because the Supreme Court says [it] cannot" (alternation in original))).
86. The federal statute still did not include an exception for the health of the mother.
See Carhart 1, 530 U.S. at 947-51.
87. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1628.
88. Id. at 1624. Congress specifically stated that '[a] moral, medical, and ethical con-
sensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion... is a gruesome and
inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should be prohibited.'" Id.
(quoting Pub. L. No. 108-105, § (2)7, 117 Stat. 1201 (reprinted in the notes following 18
U.S.C. § 1531 (2000)). Justice Ginsburg attacked the truth of this statement in her spirited
dissent. Id. at 1644 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1641.
90. Id. at 1634 (majority opinion) ("Respect for human life finds an ultimate expres-
sion in the bond of love the mother has for her child.").
91. Id. at 1633.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1634.
94. Id. at 1633.
95. Id. at 1621.
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Furthermore, Justice Kennedy's opinion again draws an analogy
between the fetus and an infant, 97 noting that " [t] he Act proscribes a
method of abortion in which a fetus is killed just inches before com-
pletion of the birth process."98 In one of the opinion's the most shock-
ing, oft-quoted passages, Justice Kennedy recounts the "clinical"
observations of a nurse during an abortion procedure:
The baby's little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his little
feet were kicking. Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of
his head, and the baby's arms jerked out, like a startle reaction, like
a flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he's going to fall. 99
The fact that the nonviable fetus here is referred to as a "baby"
demonstrates the majority's obvious decision to equate abortion with
a crime-in this case, infanticide. As Justice Ginsburg notes in her
dissent, however, the fetus at this point remains nonviable, and the
Court's language in this regard'0° is merely an attempt to blur Casey's
once-crucial dividing line between viability and nonviability. 10' In-
deed, these passages from the Carhart II majority demonstrate the fe-
vered pitch reached in the abortion debate, and according to Justice
Ginsburg, amount to nothing more than an "antiabortion
shibboleth."10 2
Carhart II also adopts a markedly paternalistic tone, noting, even
in the absence of "reliable data to measure the phenomenon," the
"regret" many women feel after choosing to have an abortion.10 3 Jus-
tice Ginsburg sums up the majority's flawed reasoning as follows:
96. Id. at 1622.
97. Id. at 1632.
98. Id. at 1632-33.
99. Id. at 1622. Justice Kennedy further applauds the abortion ban for "express[ing]
respect for the dignity of human life." Id. at 1631.
100. See also id. at 1650 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("The Act [legitimately] appl[ies]
both previability and postviability because... a fetus is a living organism while within the
womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.").
101. Id. at 1647 ("Delivery of an intact, albeit nonviable, fetus warrants special condem-
nation, the Court maintains, because a fetus that is not dismembered resembles an infant.
But so, too, does a fetus delivered intact after it is terminated by injection a day or two
before the surgical evacuation, or a fetus delivered through medical induction or cesarean.
Yet, the availability of those procedures-along with the D&E by dismemberment-the
Court says, saves the ban on intact D&E from a declaration of unconstitutionality." (inter-
nal citations omitted)).
102. Id. at 1648.
103. Id. at 1634 (majority opinion). Although admitting that there exists "no reliable
data to measure the phenomenon," Justice Kennedy remarks that "it seems unexceptiona-
ble to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained." Id.
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Because of women's fragile emotional state and because of the
"bond of love the mother has for her child," the [majority] worries,
doctors may withhold information about the nature of [relevant
abortion] procedure. The solution the Court approves, then, is not
to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of
the different procedures and their attendant risks. Instead, the
Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice,
even at the expense of their safety.
104
Finally, and most strikingly, Justice Kennedy's opinion embodies
an almost complete indifference towards women and their reproduc-
tive autonomy.1 0 5 Throughout the majority's detailed description of
the various abortion procedures, the Court scarcely mentions women
at all; instead, Justice Kennedy writes only of "the fetus," "the cervix,"
and the "abortion doctor,"1 0 6 obviously a pejorative term for the at-
tending physician. 10 7 Gone is the Court's concern with the liberty of
the woman making the difficult decision to terminate her pregnancy,
which the Court previously derived from her "dignity and autonomy,"
her "personhood," and her "conception of ... her place in society."' 0 8
To the contrary, Carhart II employs sleight-of-hand rhetoric that
removes the focus from the woman and places it instead on the un-
born fetus. Indeed, the dissenting Justices recognized this obvious
framing for exactly what it is: a sinister attempt to dismantle Roe and
the right to a legal abortion. 0 9
H. The Evolution of Embryo "Adoption"
Against this backdrop, laden as it is with moral and theological
quandaries about the beginnings of life, lVF emerged as a new tech-
104. Id. at 1648-49 (Ginsberg,J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). In a footnote
to this passage, Justice Ginsburg forcefully declares that "[e]liminating or reducing
women's reproductive choices is manifestly not a means of protecting them." Id. at 1648
n.9.
105. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) ("[T]he ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the nation has been facili-
tated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."), and id. at 860 (noting that the
right to choose an abortion has "defin[ed] the capacity of women to act in society, and to
make reproductive decisions.").
106. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1624-25.
107. Justice Ginsburg notes this in her dissent. Id. at 1650 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1640 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851-52).
109. Id. at 1653 ("In candor, the Act, and the Court's defense of it, cannot be under-
stood as anything other than an effort to chip away at a right declared again and again by
this Court-and with increasing comprehension of its centrality to women's lives."); cf id.
at 1650 (noting that "Casey's principles, confirming the continuing vitality of the essential
holding of Roe, are merely 'assume[d]' for the moment, rather than retained or reaf-
firmed" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
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nology that allows human conception outside of the uterus. As a prac-
tical matter, doctors performing 1VF regularly produce more embryos
than are needed to implant in the woman who desires to become
pregnant, leading to an "exploding frozen [embryo] population."'110
Recent estimates indicate that there are currently between 400,000
and 500,000 embryos in storage in the United States.1" As a result, a
new and difficult question has arisen over how best to deal with the
destruction, preservation, donation, or, at issue in this Comment, so-
called "adoption" of these unused embryos. 112
Mirroring the sentiments of the pro-life community in general,
those in favor of "adoption" believe that human life begins at concep-
tion, even if that conception occurs in a Petri dish. 113 This view is justi-
fied in part by the belief that each fertilized embryo has a unique
composition,11 4 a proposition that at least one scholar finds "debata-
ble."'1 5 For these individuals, destruction of the embryo is strictly pro-
hibited and in instances in which couples are left with more embryos
110. Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov 't Reform Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, 107th Cong. 75 (2001) (statement of
Joann L. Davidson, Program Director, Snowflakes Embryo Adoption Program).
111. Katz, supra note 6, at 304. Snowflakes claims the number is as high as 500,000.
Nightlight Christian Adoptions, Snowflakes Frequently Asked Questions by Adopting Fami-
lies, http://www.nightlight.org/programsSnowflakesFrozenEmbryoFaqs.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2009).
112. See Katz, supra note 6, at 305-06 ("Views on the moral status of the ex utero em-
bryo range across a wide continuum... [At one end of the spectrum,] many believe that
the embryo is the equivalent of a born human being even if it is in storage. They believe
that failure to show full respect for embryonic life is to de-value all human life. Supporters
of this view oppose stem cell research and embryo freezing, and some espouse embryo
donation of surplus embryos and/or their mandatory transfer to other women's uteri for
attempts at pregnancy. At the other end of the continuum is the view that the ex utero
embryo is just another type of bodily tissue, nothing but a clump of cells. Because these
cells lack sentience, have no interests to be protected, and are neither conscious nor self-
conscious, embryos enjoy no moral claims of their own. Some scholars find significance in
the fact that the fertilized egg in vitro cannot develop into a fetus all by itself." (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 304 ("[P]rogenitors have a number
of options for the disposition of their frozen embryos. They may use the embryos for at-
tempts at a future pregnancy, donate them to be used for research, give them to another
couple who hopes to initiate a pregnancy, leave them in cryostorage indefinitely, or re-
quest that they be discarded.").
113. See Batsedis, supra note 3, at 571 (discussing the view that "embryos . . . [are]
human persons with the same moral status as adults and children" (internal quotations
omitted)).
114. Even Former President George W. Bush, as he vetoed a bill permitting stem cell
research, commented that "[e]ach of these human embryos is a unique human life with
inherent dignity and matchless value .. " David Stout, In First Veto, Bush Blocks Stem Cell
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/washing
ton/19cnd-stem.html.
115. Katz, supra note 6, at 320.
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than are needed to complete their own IVF, offering these embryos
for "adoption" is the only accepted alternative.11 6
The other side generally believes that life begins at birth, and
thus, that "embryos are a mere cluster of cells, and no moral duty is
owed to them."117 This view, however, is not necessarily entertained
only by those who support abortion. Abortion opponent Senator Or-
rin Hatch, for example, is also a proponent of stem cell research,
which generates much the same debate as IVF.118 Senator Hatch has
famously stated that he has great difficulty equating "a child living in
the womb, with moving toes and fingers and a beating heart, with an
embryo in the freezer."1 19 Although pro-choice advocates would take
serious issue with Senator Hatch's characterization of a fetus living in
the womb as a "child," they would agree with his characterization of
the embryos at issue.
A. Snowflakes Embryo Adoption Program
Soon after its advent in the late 1970s, 120 the medical community
began grappling with the moral and ethical issues associated with
IVF. 121 The debate heated up further in 1983 when a donated embryo
was successfully implanted in an infertile woman, resulting in the first
viable pregnancy of this kind.1 22 Although that pregnancy did not re-
116. See id.; see also Batsedis, supra note 3, at 566-67 (noting that those opposed to the
destruction of the embryo "maintain that stem cell research is analogous to infanticide or
brazen homicide"); Conde, supra note 16, at 284-85 (describing the "massacre" of "living
human embryos").
117. Batsedis, supra note 3, at 571.
118. Katz, supra note 6, at 320.
119. Id. SenatorJohn McCain and Former Senator Bill Frist, also strong opponents of
abortion, support expanding federal funding for embryonic stem cell research, which re-
quires the utilization of embryos created for but not used in IVF. Id. at 320-21; see also
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Reconsidering Embryo Research, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2001 (stating that
Senator John McCain, who is in the "pro-life camp," supports stem cell research); Politics,
Science, Morality of Stem Cell Issue, CNN.coM, July 18, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/
ALLPOLITICS/07/18/Bash.debrief.focus/ (reporting that Senator Bill Frist also supports
federal funding for research on stem cells).
120. Louise Brown, the world's first "test tube baby," was born on July 25, 1978. Anne
Taylor Fleming, New Frontiers in Conception, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1980, at SM4.
121. See, e.g., ROBERT EDWARDS & PATRICK STEPTOE, A MATTER OF LIFE (1980) (discuss-
ing the role of science in creating human life); see also Dena Kleiman, Anguished Search to
Cure Infertility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1979, at SM0; Janet Bataille, Research in Human Embryos
Raises Fear and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1980, at A14; Allen L. Otten, Study Cites Lack of
Success with In Vitro Fertilization, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1988, at 1. Note that this is about the
same time that Roe, decided in 1973, was dominating popular discourse.
122. Alan Trounson et al., Pregnancy Established in an Infertile Patient After Transfer of a
Donated Embryo Fertilised In Vitro, 286 BRIT. MED. J. 835 (1983), available at http://www.
pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1547212&blobtype=pdf.
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suit in a live birth, researchers were soon able to achieve the first do-
nor egg birth in 1984123 and the first donated embryo birth in
1985.124 Since then, concerns about regulation of this newfound tech-
nology have continued to dominate scientific, medical, and political
discourse.' 25 Only recently, however, has the discussion shifted from
embryo "donation" to embryo "adoption."1 26
On July 25, 2002, the U.S. Office of Public Health and Science, as
part of the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"),
first announced the provision of federal funds "to develop and imple-
ment public awareness campaigns regarding embryo adoption."' 27
The funding for this new campaign-$1 million allocated to DHHS
earlier that year-was to be used "to inform Americans about the exis-
tence of spare embryos and options for couples to adopt an embryo or
embryos in order to bear children .... ,"128 DHHS further defined
embryo "adoption" as "the donation of frozen embryo(s) from one
party to a recipient who wishes to bear and raise a child." 2 9 Although
"adoption" may be the preferred pro-life rhetoric of choice (since it
places the emphasis on the embryo being adopted, rather than the
couple who is "donating"), it is interesting, and certainly revealing,
that even the federal government is unable to define the former with-
out reference to the latter.
123. Sandra Blakeslee, Infertile Woman Has Baby Through Embryo Transfer, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb 4, 1984; see also Peter Lutjen et al., The Establishment and Maintenance of Pregnancy Using
In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Donation in a Patient with Primary Ovarian Failure, 307 NATURE
174 (1984), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v307/n5947/abs/
307174a0.html.
124. W. Feichtinger et al., Pregnancy After Total Ovariectomy Achieved by Ovum Donation,
LANCET, Sept. 28, 1985, at 722-23; see also Conde, supra note 16, at 279.
125. See Otto Friedrich, A Legal, Moral, Social Nightmare, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984; Claudia
Wallis, The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984.
126, Sarah Blustain, Embryo Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005 ("This year, opponents
of abortion stepped up their use of a carefully chosen phrase-"embryo adoption"-that
describes a couples' decision to have a baby using the embryos of another couple.").
127. Announcement of the Availability of Financial Assistance and Request for Applica-
tions to Support Development and Delivery of Public Awareness Campaigns on Embryo
Adoptions, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,655 (July 25, 2002).
128. H.R. Rep. No. 107-342, at 112 (2001).
129. Announcement of the Availability of Financial Assistance and Request for Applica-
tions to Support Development and Delivery of Public Awareness Campaigns on Embryo
Adoptions, 67 Fed. Reg. at 48,655 (emphasis added). Interestingly, also in 2002, DHHS
"issued a new regulation making embryos and fetuses eligible for health care benefits
under the State Children's Health Insurance Program ('SCHIP'), while [simultaneously]
rejecting calls to expand coverage to uninsured pregnant women." Susan L. Crockin,
"What Is an Embyo?": A Legal Perspective, 36 CONN. L. REv. 1177, 1184 (2004). Crockin notes
further that "[c]ritics have questioned whether post-partum or post-miscarriage care would
be delivered to the woman whose fetus had been covered." Id.
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The Snowflakes Embryo Adoption Program, a division of the Cali-
fornia-based Nightlight Christian Adoption agency, soon became the
leading provider of "adoptions" under this federal grant.'30 Devel-
oped in 1997, the agency takes its name from its notion that frozen
embryos, like snowflakes, "are unique and fragile," and can never be
created in exactly the same way twice.' 3 ' Although the group possesses
no medical background or expertise, it emerged as a leader in its field
based simply on its belief that "[an] embryo is a baby from the minute
it [comes into existence] in a laboratory dish."'132 Former President
George W. Bush is a Snowflakes cheerleader, advocating for "adop-
tion" as a "life-affirming alternative."'13 3 In July 2006, he staged a pub-
lic relations coup of sorts when he used his first presidential veto on a
stem-cell research bill while surrounded by several "snowflake babies"
and their families.' 34
According to the Snowflakes website, embryo "adoption" is a pro-
cess where "individuals who have their own frozen embryos agree to
release them to the adopting couple. s13 5 The process begins once an
"adoptive" family contacts Snowflakes and indicates its desire to re-
ceive a donated embryo. a36 The family then fills out an application
that consists of a "Dear Genetic Parent" introduction letter, a short
130. Katz, supra note 6, at 321.
131. NIGHTLIGHT, SNowFLAKEs FACT SHEET, supra note 7; see also Press Release, Presi-
dent Discusses Embryo Adoption and Ethical Stem Cell Research (May 24, 2005) (on file
with author) ("[T]here is no such thing as a spare embryo. Every embryo is unique and
genetically complete, like every other human being."); Batsedis, supra note 3, at 569
("[Snowflakes] is an agency that treats embryos just as if they were regular babies.").
132. Arthur Caplan, The Problem with "Embryo Adoption," MSNBC.coM, June 24, 2003,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3076556/.
133. Press Release, President Discusses Embryo Adoption and Ethical Stem Cell Re-
search, supra note 131.
134. Rick Klein, Bush Vetoes Stem Cell Research Bil4 BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 2006, available
at http://www.boston.com/news/science/articles/2006/07/20/bush-vetoesstemscell
research-bill/. According to one scholar, President Bush defers to "ideologically charged
culture of life rhetoric to promote embryo adoptions as the only alternative to dispose of
[embryos]." Conde, supra note 16, at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted). Another
scholar notes that "the [Bush] administration . . . steadily and stealthily inject[ed] a right-
to-life policy agenda into the petri dish and laboratory." Crockin, supra note 129, at 1183.
135. Embryo Adoption Awareness Center, What is Embryo Adoption and Donation?,
http://www.embryoadoption.org/about/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). The
agency provides both open and closed "adoptions," in which the genetic couple can
choose to take either an active role or a completely anonymous role in the future child's
life, assuming the donation results in a viable birth. Id. For the most part, Snowflakes pre-
fers open adoptions so that donating couples have the opportunity to play a role in the
selection of the "adoptive" couple. Batsedis, supra note 3, at 569.
136. NIGHTLIGHT, SNowFLAKEs FACT SHEET, supra note 7.
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biography on the family, and a photo collage. 137 Although Snowflakes
claims that it "work[s] with families of various faiths," the organization
does explicitly require that "adoptive" families "commit[ ] to provid-
ing their child with a . . . spiritual home environment. '" 138 Further-
more, Snowflakes requires couples seeking a donation to have been
married for at least two and a half years at the time of their
application.13 9
After a couple has applied, Snowflakes is licensed by the Califor-
nia State Department of Social Services to conduct a home study of
the "adoptive" family.140 This process includes a background check for
criminal history and child abuse, as well as education for the "adop-
tive" family on how to raise a child, should one result from the im-
plantation of the "adopted" embryo. 141 Once cleared through the
home study process, families are matched with donors based on the
genetic couple's preferences on everything from ethnicity, to age, to
religion, to family size, to geographic location, to education, and even
to family income. 142
137. Id. at 2.
138. Id. at 1.
139. Id. at 2. This requirement effectively excludes homosexual couples and single
mothers from the program. Even if a gay couple were legally married (in a state such as
California, Connecticut, or Massachusetts), it is doubtful that the fundamentalist Snow-
flakes would approve of such a marriage, or that many donating families would allow the
placement of their embryo in the home of a gay couple. See Liza Mundy, Out of the Freezer,
Into the Family, SLATE, May 31, 2005, http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&
id=2119845 ("The typical Snowflakes donor, while not necessarily Christian or conserva-
tive, is unlikely to favor gays, lesbians, or even single mothers."); see also Shari Roan, The
Embryo Dilemma: She Can Donate; Who Will Adopt?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at F7 ("Wolfe
rejected using an embryo adoption service because many of those centers have restrictive
criteria about who can adopt an embryo, such as requiring that the parents be married
heterosexuals.").
140. NIGHTLIGHT, SNowntAKEs FACT SHEET, supra note 7, at 1-2.
141. Nightlight Christian Adoptions, Snowflakes Frequently Asked Questions by Em-
bryo Placing Families, http://www.nightlight.org/programs-SnowflakesFrozenEmbryo
PlacingFAQs.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions by
Embryo Placing Families].
142. NIGHTLIGHT, SNOwELAKEs FACT SHEET, supra note 7, at 2; see also, e.g., Adoptive
Families Sought for Immediate Matching, http://www.nightlight.org/programsSnow-
flakeslmmediatePlacement.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). According toJoann Davidson,
Program Director of Snowflakes Embryo Adoption, "embryo adoption is better than em-
bryo donation because it involves a thorough screening process designed to ensure that
embryos are placed with stable families .... Brandon S. Mercer, Embryo Adoption: Where are
the Laws?, 26J. Juv. L. 73, 81. Thus, the purpose of adoptive family evaluation is "to assess
[the couple] as potential adoptive parents (physically, emotionally, and financially)." Id. at
82.
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Once Snowflakes selects a match, it drafts a pre-pregnancy con-
tract for the parties to sign. 143 Snowflakes admits, however, that while
it hopes "current laws for adoption will simply be expanded to include
embryos," these contracts are currently based on the concept of em-
bryos as property. 144 The donating couple agrees to relinquish all pa-
rental rights over the unimplanted embryo, and states that any baby
resulting from the embryo transfer "will bear the name of the adoptive
parents and have inheritance rights through only the adoptive fam-
ily."'145 On the other side, the receiving family must agree that "follow-
ing the adoption and implantation, any embryos not used by the
adopting couple must be returned to their genetic parents.' 46 Impor-
tantly, but not surprisingly, excess embryos "cannot be destroyed, nor
may they be aborted."'1 47
Despite such a formalized process for linking donors and "adop-
tive" families, and despite receiving funding each year since 2001, only
185 children have been born to 138 families (including 23 families
who had sibling pregnancies) .148
B. Codification in State Law
The Supreme Court abortion cases discussed in Part I explicitly
recognize that a fetus does not hold any substantive rights under our
Federal Constitution, which is in large part why abortion is legal in
this country. 149 The same is not true, however, for the IVF embryos
before they are implanted in a woman's uterus. No federal law or Su-
preme Court decision prevents individual states from assigning rights
to or mandating the protection of embryos used in assisted reproduc-
tion. 150 That leaves states free to attempt regulation beyond and apart
from the reach of Roe v. Wade, even if embryo protection statutes ulti-
mately erode the very premise upon which legalized abortion is
largely based.
143. Frequently Asked Questions by Embryo Placing Families, supra note 141.
144. Id.
145. Batsedis, supra note 3, at 570.
146. Id.
147. Id. According to Batsedis, "[als a result, most adopting couples tend to be relig-
ious Christians. In fact, those affiliated with Snowflakes tend to want their embryos raised
with a religious family. Snowflakes has admitted that most of its 'clients believe that life
begins at conception."' Id. at 572.
148. Frequently Asked Questions by Embryo Placing Families, supra note 141. Sibling
pregnancies are those where the mother gives birth to more than one child, a common
phenomenon with IVF.
149. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
150. See Kat, supra note 6, at 326.
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No state court has yet assigned the embryo any explicit legal per-
sonhood.151 Instead, courts consistently treat lVF embryos as some
form of property, rather than as a human child that possesses individ-
ual rights. 152 This accords with the American Society of Reproductive
Medicine's ethical statement on the regulation of IVF, which clearly
states that frozen embryos are the "property" of their progenitors.
153
In contrast, embryos have been granted legal personhood by the
legislatures of at least two different states: Louisiana and New Mex-
ico. 154 In Louisiana, by far the most radical in this respect, a statute
establishes that the "human embryo" 155 is "a juridical person"1 56 that
is entitled to "sue or be sued. '1 57 Importantly, the statute prohibits the
embryo from being "intentionally destroyed" 158 by either the IVF
couple or the treating physician, referred to in the statute as the "tem-
porary guardian.' 159 Instead, IVF couples who renounce their "paren-
tal rights" to these embryos are mandated to make them available for
"adoptive implantation" by "another married couple. '1 60 A similar
151. See id. at 316. The hesitancy by courts to weigh in on embryo protection echoes
the sentiments of the Court in Roe, when it stated:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development
of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
152. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) ("We conclude that
preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim
category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life. It
follows that any interest that [the progenitors] have in the preembryos in this case is not a
true property interest. However, they do have an interest in the nature of ownership, to the
extent that they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos,
within the scope of policy set by law."); see also Katz, supra note 6, at 327 ("Although [some]
courts have recognized the dispositional authority of the gamete providers, they have taken
care not to classify the embryos as property but rather as occupying an interim category
.... Nevertheless, when the courts state that contracts may govern the disposition of the
unused embryos, they are tacitly treating the embryos as property.").
153. See Batsedis, supra note 3, at 567 (citing Am. Fertility Society, Ethical Statement on In
Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY & STEJRrLITY 12 (1984)).
154. Katz, supra note 6, at 323. Furthermore, a Florida statute adopts the rhetoric of
Snowflakes and defines "fertility technique" to include "artificial embryonation, artificial
insemination, whether in vivo or in vitro, egg donation, or emb0yo adoption." F.S.A.
§ 63.213(2) (h) (i) (6) (c) (2008) (emphasis added).
155. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2008).
156. Id. § 9:124.
157. Id.
158. Id. § 9:129.
159. Id. § 9:126. If the progenitors fail to express their identity, the physician is further
empowered to "protect the in vitro fertilized human ovum's rights." Id.
160. Id. § 9:130; see also Batsedis, supra note 3, at 567; Katz, supra note 6, at 323 (citing
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:129). Notice how the statute assumes that both the donating par-
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statue in New Mexico requires that all IF treatments performed in
the state be structured to "insure that each living fertilized ovum, zy-
gote or embryo is implanted in a human female recipient."1 61 Because
these statutes effectively deny the IVF couple the decision-making con-
trol over their "property," they are of questionable constitutionality
and could possibly be subject to challenges based on procreative
liberty. 162
Noteworthy in both of these state statutes is the use of charged
language implicating the debate over legal abortion. 63 Observe how
the Louisiana State Legislature uses "adoptive implantation," a deriva-
tive of the word "adoption" to describe the mandatory implantation of
excess embryos. 164 Similarly, the New Mexico statute defines the fertil-
ized embryo as "living."' 65
In fact, Louisiana is particularly aggressive in legislating against a
woman's right to choose: Louisiana was one of nine states to draft
anti-abortion legislation in the wake of the confirmation of Justices
Alito and Roberts to the Supreme Court in early 2006.166 As a result of
this and other efforts in the state, the parent of a minor must consent
before an abortion is provided;167 a woman must receive state-directed
counseling that includes information designed to discourage her from
having an abortion and then wait twenty-four hours before the proce-
dure is provided; 168 and public funding for abortions is limited to
cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest.' 69 Given this relationship
ents and the adoptive parents are married. This view that only married couples should
consider parenthood is entirely consistent with the view adopted by Snowflakes. See discus-
sion supra note 139 and accompanying text.
161. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1 (D) (West 2000); see also generally Cynthia Reilly, Consti-
tutional Limits on New Mexico's In Vitro Fertilization Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 125 (1994) (discuss-
ing the New Mexico statute).
162. See Crockin supra note 129, at 1180; see also discussion supra Part II.B.
163. "According to Professor PaulaJ. Manning, pro-life advocates prefer the emotion-
ally charged term embryo adoption because they believe all embryos are potential chil-
dren." Conde, supra note 16, at 280.
164. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 ("adoptive").
165. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1 (D).
166. Ed Anderson, State Abortion Ban goes to House Floor, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 18, 2006,
at Al, available at http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/capital/index.ssf?/base/news-3/114793
8887224000.xml&coll=l; see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30 (2008) ("'Unborn
human being' means an individual living member of the species, homo sapiens, through-
out the entire embryonic and fetal stages of the unborn child from fertilization to full
gestation and childbirth."); State Facts About Abortion in Louisiana, http://
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/louisiana.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
167. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.33(D) (2008).
168. Id. § 40:1299.35.6(B)(1).
169. Id. § 40:1299.34.5(A)-(B).
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between Louisiana's regulation of embryo disposition and the aggres-
sive limitations on the availability of abortion in the state, the infer-
ence arises that Louisiana may have been motivated by priorities
outside of the IVF context when drafting their respective statutes.
(The same may also be true of New Mexico, although the state does
not have any similar restrictions on abortion.) Indeed, these statutes
exemplify the war of words that fuels the abortion debate, where a
change in language can mean a change in the ability of women to
access a legal medical procedure.
III. Implications of "Adopting" a New Rhetoric to Define
Embryo Donation
While it may be difficult to attack the commendable decision by
an IVF couple to donate their unwanted embryos to a deserving infer-
tile couple, 170 the recent trend towards terming this act an "adoption"
has sparked a heated backlash from the pro-choice community.
171
170. This is indeed a testament to our increasing comfort with the concept of IVF, as is
the fact that at least sixteen states have statutes addressing assisted reproduction. See, e.g.,
CAL. HEALTH & StAFETv CODE § 125315 (West 2006) (requiring fertility doctors to inform
patients about the option to store, donate, or discard unused embryos); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 19-4-106 (1999) (discussing the parental status of children resulting from assisted repro-
duction); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-102 (2004) (defining "assisted reproduction" to in-
clude the "donation of embryos"); FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2005) (stating that donation of
preembryos results in the relinquishment of parental rights); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:126
(1991) (providing that progenitors can make excess embryos available for "adoptive im-
plantation"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1 (1991) (defining donor as "an individual who
contributes for the purpose of artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, or implantation
in another, or a woman who contributes a preembryo"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-2 (West
2002) (requiring fertility doctors to inform patients about the option to store, donate, or
discard unused embryos); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1 (West 1985) (requiring fertility doc-
tors to inform patients about the option to store, donate, or dispose of unused embryos);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-02(4) (2005) (defining "assisted reproduction" to include the
"[d]onation of embryos"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97 (LexisNexis 1986) (establish-
ing rules for embryo donation and specifying that the birth mother, rather than the donor,
is the natural mother of the child); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10 § 556 (2000) (regulating "human
embryo transfer" and providing that a child born as a result of embryo implantation has no
rights with respect to the donating couple); TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 160.102 (Vernon 2007)
(defining "donor" as "an individual who provides eggs or sperm to a licensed physician to
be used for assisted reproduction"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 781-15-102 (2005) (defining "as-
sisted reproduction" to include "donation of eggs" and "donation of embryos"); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-158 (2000) (providing that "[a] donor is not the parent of a child conceived
through assisted conception"); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.26.011 (2005) (defining "assisted
reproduction" to include the donation of eggs and embryos); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-902
(2003) (providing that "[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted
reproduction").
171. See Batsedis, supra note 3, at 570 ("While some believe embryo adoption is a scien-
tific break-through, others believe it could be the next big battlefield in the abortion de-
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One scholar contends the shift towards "adoption" rhetoric is meant
simply to encourage 1VF couples to offer their unwanted embryos to
infertile couples. 172 This explanation, however, only demonstrates the
relative interchangeability of the words "adoption" and "donation" in
this context, and begs the question of whether there exists any func-
tional or meaningful distinction between the two terms.
A. An Attempt to Refocus the Discussion
One of the most incendiary, inflammatory, and offensive law re-
view articles published in recent years was written by self-professed
"anti-abortionist[s]" who firmly believe that all unwanted embryos
should be candidates for "adoption. ' 173 Beyond the implicit link be-
bate." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, the American Civil Liberties
Union, Planned Parenthood, and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
all warn that the "attempt to give an embryo the status of a person raise[s] concerns with
respect to reproductive rights." Lynne Marie Kohm, What's My Place In This World? A Re-
sponse to Professor Ellen Waldman's What Do We Tell The Children?, 35 CAP. U. L. REv. 563, 584
(citing A.B. 1926, Bill Analysis, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1901-
1950/ab_1926_cfa_20060330_165950_asmcomm.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2009)).
172. Batsedis, supra note 3, at 570.
173. Dr. Walter Block & Roy Whitehead, Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private
Property Rights Approach to Resolving the Abortion Controversy, 4 APPALACHANJ. L. 1, 44 (2005).
Given my thesis in this Comment, I do not use "incendiary," "inflammatory," or "offensive"
lightly. Instead, I believe Block and Whitehead's article is objectively outrageous. The au-
thors open their article by stating that the "easy availability [of abortion] fuels the ire of
and represents the equivalent of a holocaust to anti-abortion advocates." Id. at 1. The au-
thors apparently consider themselves as among this group of anti-abortionists, as they
agree with this sentiment later in the article:
[One] analogy [from history] is that between abortion and the Nazi holocaust.
Both incidents are associated with massive slaughter of innocents. If the immoral-
ity of an act is correlated with the helplessness and innocence of the victims, then
the moral outrage now directed at Nazis might better be vented in the direction
of pro-choicers. For surely the Jews who were slaughtered, no matter how inno-
cent of any wrong doing themselves, were at least more responsible for their fate
than the fetuses victimized by abortion. This practice attacks the weakest and
most defenseless members of our society. It is one thing to do away with adults, as
in the case of the Jewish Holocaust, the Bosnian "ethnic cleansing," or the mass
murder in Rwanda. The suffering is pitiful, but at least for the most part the
victims were adults. In the event, they were unable to protect themselves against
their enemies. But they had this option, at least theoretically.
Id. at 14-15.
Not content with that shocking analogy, the authors go on to compare abolitionists
who freed slaves in the pre-Civil War era with anti-abortionists fighting to make abortion
illegal today. Their article states:
Each attempts (attempted) to safeguard the well-being and even the very lives of a
particularly helpless group of people. If anything, the present day pro-life forces
are in a worse position than their nineteenth century counterparts. For one thing,
the fetus is far more helpless than was the black slave. The latter could "run away"
with the help of the Underground Railroad and other such institutions. No three-
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tween the authors' anti-abortion views and their pro-"adoption" views,
important in its own right, this article is instructive in allowing pro-
choice advocates an important glimpse into "enemy" territory.
In their article, Dr. Walter Block and Roy Whitehead describe the
key steps that must be achieved in order to overturn the Supreme
Court's holding in Roe.174 Among those steps, Block and Whitehead
contend that the pro-life community "must establish by law, govern-
ment policy, and most important, in the minds of voters, that a fetus is
a human being.' 75 They continue: "If a fetus is human it warrants the
equal protection of the law afforded to the mother." 76
Indeed, Snowflakes's rhetoric achieves exactly what Block and
Whitehead call for in their article: it refocuses the discussion on em-
bryonic life and advances a transparently pro-life agenda. 177 When
Snowflakes refers to the service it provides as "adoption," the implica-
tion arises that a living, breathing baby is somehow involved in the
process. 178 This is because the term "adoption" places the emphasis
on the rights of the putative would-be baby-to be adopted-while
week old fetus has the maturity to initiate or even remotely cooperate in any such
venture. True, the pro-lifers can try to convince a pregnant woman not to abort,
but in order to save the baby's life they have to convince the potentially evil doer
mother, not of course the fetus. In contrast, the organizers of the underground
railroad did not have to convince the masters of anything-not very likely, in any
case-but only the slaves, a far less difficult task.
Id. at 14 (footnotes omitted).
I quite evidently and very firmly disagree with the authors and their "thesis." I do,
however, think there is value in considering Block and Whitehead's perspective, if only to
understand the approach of those with whom I undoubtedly disagree. For as unfortunate
as I may find the view embodied in their article, I fear that it is more common than many
would perceive.
174. Id. at 2.
175. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
176. Id.
177. See Michelle L. Anderson, Are You My Mommy? A Call for Regulation of Embryo Dona-
tion, 35 CAP. U. L. REv. 589, 618 ("Although the terms 'embryo adoption' and 'embryo
donation' refer to the same procedure, they are used in such a way to reveal the user's
motivations. President Bush, for example, uses only the term embryo adoption, because
one of his ultimate goals is to eliminate the use of frozen embryos in stem cell research.
IVF professionals, on the other hand, refer to the procedure as embryo donation. Pro-life
advocates use the term embryo adoption because they feel that any non-implantation use
of an embryo amounts to the taking of a human life. Pro-choice advocates, on the other
hand, use the term embryo donation, because embryos are not human lives in their view."
(citations omitted)).
178. Katz, supra note 6, at 321; see also Bradley Mattes, Saving Lives with Embryo Adoption,
LiFE ISSUES CONNECTOR, Jan. 2007, http://www.lifeissues.org/connector/2007/Jan
EmbryoAdoption.htm ("From the Executive Director") ("It's important that pro-lifers use
the correct terminology when talking about ending the life of human embryos. We should
always say that the embryos are 'killed' not 'destroyed.' Things are destroyed, but human
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the term "donation" highlights the rights of the parents-to do-
nate. 179 If the pro-"adoption" (or anti-abortion) community success-
fully shifts the focus from the parents, or specifically the woman, to
the baby, then this would be an "important symbolic step toward...
granting embryos the rights of human beings."180 This, in turn, would
"[enter a] wedge in the fight against legal abortion."'' 1
The Supreme Court's willingness to accept the principle of legal
abortion rests on the notion that a woman's right to reproductive au-
tonomy outweighs any state interest in "potential life."'1 82 This is be-
cause the Court expressly refused to recognize the unborn fetus as a
person, at least until the fetus is medically viable. 18 3 Should the law
evolve to view embryos as the equivalent of unborn children from the
moment of conception, however, as many "adoption" advocates de-
sire, then the interests of the fetus could immediately begin to factor
into the Supreme Court's balancing regarding the right to an abor-
tion. 18 4 Further, it remains unsettled whether the rights of the fetus
may eventually outweigh the interests of the mother in the Casey bal-
ancing test.'8 5
In a worst-case scenario, at least from a pro-choice perspective,
the Supreme Court could hold that the fetus, from the moment of
conception or implantation, is a human being entitled to the same
legal protections as its parents.18 6 This would include the protection
of "due process of the law" under the Fifth' 8 7 and Fourteenth1
88
beings are killed. It helps to keep the humanity of this tiny person at the focus of our
debate and discussions.").
179. Kohm, supra note 171, at 584.
180. Katz, supra note 6, at 321 (quoting Sarah Blaustain, Embiyo Adoption, N.Y. TIMES
(Magazine), Dec. 11, 2005, at 67-68).
181. Id. at 333-34.
182. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 163 (1973).
183. Id. at 158; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992).
184. The Supreme Court noted and the Appellants conceded as much in Roe, 410 U.S.
at 156-57 ("The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a 'person' within the
language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at
length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of per-
sonhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus'[s] right to
life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.").
185. See Katz, supra note 6, at 339 ("[S]uch a shift would be incompatible with the
treatment of the fetus in abortion jurisprudence. Whether the woman's interest in her
bodily integrity would outweigh the interest of the fetus is an open question.").
186. See id. at 334. "If the ex utero embryo, which even if implanted has a small chance
of resulting in a child, is protected life, then surely the developing in vivo embryo or fetus
should be protected." Id.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
188. U.S. CONS-I. amend. XIV.
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Amendments, as well as, presumably, any applicable homicide stat-
utes.189 In this case, abortion would have to be illegal in every conceiv-
able scenario because the fetus would be protected even in cases
where the woman's health was at risk: if the fetus is a person, then its
life is worth no less than its mother's, and the law could never chose to
save one, and not the other. South Dakota is at least one state that has
prepared for such a scenario. Its legislature recently rejected all limita-
tions that might mitigate an outright ban on abortion, including pro-
scribing the procedure in the case of rape or incest, irrespective of the
health or life of the mother.190
Even if the Court responds less drastically and simply elevates the
state's interest in the potentiality of human life before viability (justi-
fied by the implication of the fetus's personhood), the effect nonethe-
less constitutes a serious threat to the fundamental right to an
abortion. 91 With such wide license to limit an unpopular procedure,
our conservative Court could find that even the state interests in the
promotion of life and the reduction of abortions (which are present
from the time of conception) justify significant restrictions on the
right to seek the procedure at all times throughout the pregnancy.
This could mean that the Court proscribes all, or nearly all abortions,
perhaps limited only where the woman's life or health is in grave dan-
ger. In fact, several states, including Ohio, Indiana, Louisiana, Geor-
gia, Tennessee, and Kentucky have already prepared their abortion
statutes for such a scenario. 19 2 This reality makes the pro-choice com-
munity's fear more than a mere conspiracy theory, and demonstrates
the real consequences at stake in the embryo "adoption" discussion.
B. Complications that Develop from the Use of "Adoption"
Rhetoric
Beyond the transparent threat that embryo "adoptions" pose to
abortion, they are additionally suspect because of the problems they
create when the term "adoption" is applied literally in our legal sys-
tem. As recognized by one scholar, "[s] imply calling embryo donation
'embryo adoption' does not, and cannot, make [the process] fit
189. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57 (recognizing that if the fetus is guaranteed the protection
of the Constitution, then it implicitly has the right to life).
190. Evelyn Nieves, S.D. Abortion Bill Takes Aim at "Roe, "WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2006, at
Al. Lawmakers feared that the articulation of such "'special circumstances' would have
diluted the bill and its impact on the national scene." Id.
191. This scenario appears even more plausible since the Court already began to move
in that direction with Casey, and more recently, with Carhart I and Carhart II.
192. Nieves, supra note 190.
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within those legal constructs .... ,"193 For example, the term "adop-
tion" and the implication that embryos are human beings does noth-
ing to clarify the relationship between an embryo and other human
life. Although much of this Comment assumes that the life of the em-
bryo would be regarded as equal to all other human life, can that be
right? If an embryo is truly regarded as the functional equivalent of a
living child, then in a custody dispute, such as the one seen in Davis v.
Davis,1 94 where a divorcing couple disagreed over disposition of their
frozen embryos, would the court use "a best interest of the child" anal-
ysis in determining which party should get custody over the em-
bryo?195 In fact, application of this standard from traditional adoption
law would have reversed the ultimate decision of the Davis court: be-
cause Mrs. Davis wanted the unused embryos to be donated to an IVF
couple, and Mr. Davis simply wanted the embryos destroyed, a court
applying a "best interest" standard would have awarded custody to
Mrs. Davis. 196 However, this decision would make Mr. Davis a genetic
father against his will and create a whole new set of problems in rec-
onciling embryo law with other reproductive freedoms. 19 7
193. Crockin, supra note 129, at 1184; see alsoJames B. Boskey &Joan Heifetz Hollin-
ger, Placing Children for Adoption, in ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, § 3.01 [1] (Joan Heifetz
Hollinger et al. eds., 2005) (describing the legal fundamentals of traditional adoption).
194. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
195. Katz, supra note 6, at 309. Quizzically, the notion of "matching" parents with a yet-
to-be-born child could prove difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, if the "best interests"
standard is adopted, at least one scholar fears that parents would often be required to
"place [the interest of the child] above their own rights as adults." Kohm, supra note 171,
at 567.
196. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
197. The Louisiana statute discussed supra Part II.B, which assumes that mandated do-
nation is acceptable because the parties to whom the tVF embryos belong are being spared
the "inconvenience of pregnancy," would have a similar effect. Block & Whitehead, supra
note 173, at 43. However, this view misses that, often, "[w]hat [IVF couples] want is not to
be saved from ... pregnancy or the task of raising a ... [child; instead,] what they want is
not to be parents." Id. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Marriage of
Whitten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (recognizing that the right not to procreate will
outweigh the right to procreate when parties disagree on the use of extra IVF embryos);
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (same); J.B. v. M.B, 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001)
(same); Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (same); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (same).
In a recent article on the so-called "right not to procreate," Harvard Law Fellow Glenn
Cohen attacks the assumption that cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), implicitly guarantee the right
not to be a genetic parent. See Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate,
60 STAN. L. REv. 1135 (2008). Instead, Cohen unpacks the right to procreative autonomy
to include three separate, albeit related rights: "[T]he right not to be a genetic parent, the
right not to be a legal parent, and the right not to be a gestational parent." Id. at 1135.
Using these distinctions, Cohen concedes that Supreme Court jurisprudence unquestiona-
bly recognizes that the right not to be a gestational parent is a fundamental right (under
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Yet another issue that arises is the degree to which society would
be required to extend the analogy between embryonic cell life and
"unborn" human life. As one scholar observed, "[i] t seems doubtful
that even the strongest supporters of personhood for embryos intend
that embryos should be treated as exemptions for income tax pur-
poses, be counted in the census, or require passports if they are trans-
ported across international boundaries."'198 And yet, these are some of
the logical conclusions that result from treating an embryo as an "un-
born" or "preborn" human being. The genetic parents would have no
right to deprive their embryos of life under any circumstances, lest
they be charged with homicide. 199 This means that if unnecessary for
further attempts to achieve a pregnancy, "the embryo would end up in
state custody and could be offered to other infertile couples. '20 0 Of
course, our government does not have the resources to protect and
eventually implant the "massive number" of embryos created for LVF
use, and "it is unlikely there would be enough homes for all these
children or enough resources to support their development to adult-
hood."20 ' Should the government then impose restrictions on the
number of IVF embryos that each couple can create, to ensure that no
embryo goes without a loving home?20 2
These important questions-or more specifically, their lack of
any satisfying answers-exemplify the danger posed by even just a
small change in rhetoric. Ironically, the change from donation to
"adoption" could have the ultimate effect of making assisted repro-
ductive treatment all but impossible: doctors and clinics might start to
fear civil, and even criminal liability for the intentional or accidental
destruction of frozen embryos; 20 3 and because the destruction of fro-
zen embryos might eventually be illegal, IVF might also be prohibited
because of the general risk it poses to the many embryos that do not
result in successful pregnancy during each treatment.20 4 One wonders
Roe, as amended by Casey); however, he argues that there is no similar right not to be a
genetic parent. Id. If that is the case, it would lend credibility to the constitutionality of the
Louisiana and New Mexico statutes explored supra Part II.B.
198. Katz, supra note 6, at 335.
199. Id. at 314, 335.
200. Id. at 326. Professor Katz suggests that, "[i]f embryos are persons, then logic dic-
tates that adoption law with all of its regulations and restrictions should govern the process
of embryo donation." Id. at 337.
201. Ann Marie Noonan, The Uncertainty ofEmbyo Disposition Law: How Alterations to Roe
Could Change Everything, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 485, 513 (2007).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 514-15.
204. Id. at 512-13; see also Katz, supra note 6, at 334.
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how an organization like Snowflakes would respond to such a proposi-
tion, and whether this would change the organization's view on
"adoption."
Conclusion
Over the last thirty-five years, the pro-choice community has be-
come all too familiar with attempts to slowly and incrementally de-
prive women of their right to reproductive autonomy. The Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban of 2003 is the perfect example of such an overt
assault.205 There, the then-conservative Congress strategically attacked
an unfortunate procedure that even pro-choice advocates were hard
pressed to defend, picking up major gains in the greater rhetorical
war against Roe along the way. Rather than terming the Act "The Late
Term Abortion Ban" or "The D&X Abortion Ban," Congress capital-
ized on an opportunity to insert the word "Birth" into the Act's name,
and to further push its anti-abortion agenda. For if fetuses can be
born, then their destruction amounts to death-and even murder.
Not all attacks on the right to choose are as obvious, of course.
Take "Laci and Conner's Law," for example. 20 6 Signed into law by
then President George W. Bush in the wake of the tragic murder of
Laci Peterson by her husband Scott Peterson, the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act of 2003 recognizes that a "child in utero" can be the
victim of a homicide. 20 7 Although the statute includes an explicit ex-
ception for abortion, 208 the assignment of rights to a fetus is troub-
ling, even in such a sympathetic context as protecting pregnant
women from their violent husbands.
This Comment demonstrates how the tactical favoring of the
term embryo "adoption," as opposed to embryo donation, is an effort
by the pro-life community to use a comparatively safe environment to
strike at the heart of more controversial political issues. Because it is
difficult to argue against the donation of excess embryos, especially
when this donation leads to happy, healthy babies being born into
loving families, 209 organizations such as Snowflakes exploit our good-
will for the procedure, and pull a bait-and-switch of sorts in refraining
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003).
206. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq.) (2004).
207. Id. As used in the statute, "the term 'unborn child' means.., a member of the
species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb." Id.
208. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (c)(1).
209. One need only look to the Snowflakes website to see these happy babies on promi-
nent display. See Snowflakes Program Home Page, http://www.nightlight.org/snowflake
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the rhetoric. If we continue to let these attempts go unchecked, how-
ever, the pro-life agenda will emerge in less sympathetic contexts, cul-
minating in what many pro-choice advocates fear will be an outright
ban on the right to an abortion that was first guaranteed in Roe. Al-
though we are only talking about words, their power in this context is
immeasurable, and the ramifications that flow from this rhetorical
shift are serious and alarming.
adoption.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2009) (depicting several babies born from "adopted"
embryos).
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